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Abstract
It may seem obvious we are conscious for we are certain we see, feel and think, but there is no accepted scientific account of these
mental states as a brain condition. And since most neuroscientists assume consciousness and its supposed powers without
explaining it, science is brought into question. That consciousness does not exist is here explained. The alternative, the theory
of brain-sign, is outlined. It eliminates the quasi-divine knowledge properties of seeing, feeling and thinking. Brain-sign is a
means/mechanism enabling collective action between organisms. Brain-sign signifies the shared world of that action. Signs are
intrinsically physical and biologically ubiquitous. Brain-signs are derived moment-by-moment from the causal orientation of
each brain towards others and the world. Interactive behaviour which is not predetermined (as in passing a cup of coffee) is
characteristic of vertebrate species. Causality lies in the electrochemical operation of the brain. But identifying the changing
world by brain-signs binds the causal states of those interacting into one unified operation. Brain-signing creatures, including
humans, have no ‘sense’ they function this way. The world appears as seen. The ‘sense of seeing’, however, is the brain’s
communicative activity in joint behaviour. Similarly for ‘feeling’. Language causality results from the transmission of compres-
sion waves or electromagnetic radiation from one brain to another altering the other’s causal orientation. The ‘sense of under-
standing’ words is the communicative state. The brain understands nothing, knows nothing, believes nothing. By replacing the
prescientific notion of consciousness, brain-sign can enable a scientific path for brain science.
Keywords Brain-sign .Causalorientation .Consciousness . Interneuralcommunication . Inter-organismcommunication .Neural
interpretation
Introduction
A credibility gap lies at the heart of brain science. While con-
sciousness supposedly illuminates the world, and language sub-
jects its fabric to human mastery, it resists physical description.
How it functions is ‘explained’ by substituting other words for it
like ‘awareness’ or ‘experience’ which invoke similar non-
physical concepts (e.g. Pennartz et al. 2019; Frith and Rees
2017). As a generality, neuroscientists identify active areas and
conditions of the brain, then attribute to them mental categories
as seeing, feeling or thinking, without specifying what they add
to, or how they arise from, physical states.
At the same time, nonconscious neural activity is consid-
ered so extensive and productive of behaviour that what con-
sciousness does beyond it is regularly asked with no agreed
account emerging (e.g. Anderson 2014; Oakley and Halligan
2017). However, it seems that describing brain function re-
quires mentalist concepts and function (cognition, so-called)
while mentality itself is unexplained.
A solution is offered by brain-sign theory. Brain-sign replaces
consciousness as the brain phenomenon. It is a biophysical
means of interneural communication by organisms about the
world (including the organism itself) which facilitates collective
action by signifyingwhat in theworld is jointly targeted. It results
at each moment from the brain’s interpretation of its immediate
causal orientation towards the world. Causal orientation both
positions and can initiate bodily action. However, this is ‘invis-
ible’ to us as brain-sign, for ‘we’ are wholly determined by the
brain’s causal operation over which brain-sign has no control.
Subjectivistmental concepts and lexicon, and themind generally,
are rejected as superfluous to science. Signs are biologically
ubiquitous and intrinsically physical.
Since brain-sign is characterized by wholly physical pro-
cesses, the mind-body problem is dissolved. A clear distinc-
tion is made between the phenomenon’s biophysical operation
and its communicative content. Given the coherence of the
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theory, proponents of consciousness needs demonstrate why
brain-sign theory should not replace the intractable vagueness
and implausibility of consciousness.
The three main criteria for developing the theory are to:
1 Provide foundations for brain science by replacing con-
sciousness with brain-sign.
2 Distinguish the concepts and lexicon of brain science from
that of (colloquial) mental states.
3 Improve ordinary discourse by a more lucid account of
human being and other creatures.
After reviewing the status of consciousness and neurosci-
ence (A Background for Brain-Sign Theory), this text outlines
the theory (The Theory of Brain-Sign).
A Background for Brain-Sign Theory
Many problems are raised about consciousness: What is it?
How can it be physical? How is it identified in the brain? How
do neural states become knowledge? How do we deal with
qualia? These questions assume consciousness exists. But
consciousness has no scientific validation.
A comparison with the geocentric universe is instructive. On
earth, the heavens appeared to move over us. This vastly exag-
gerated human significance and supported a belief in a divine
realm above and a superhuman creator and ruler. Alternatives
were anathema. Similarly, the history of mind and conscious-
ness concerns a quasi-divine realm of knowledge by vision,
feeling and the power of thought. For many, experience is sup-
portive despite a literature which raises doubts. The following
illustrates why a new approach is required.
Christof Koch says: ‘Many modern analytic philosophers
of mind…find the existence of consciousness such an intoler-
able affront to what they believe should be a meaningless
universe of matter and the void that they declare it to be an
illusion…. If I have a tooth abscess, however, a sophisticated
argument to persuade me that my pain is delusional will not
lessen its torment one iota…. I have very little sympathy for
this desperate solution to the mind-body problem’ (2018).
In their book The Neurology of Consciousness, Laureys
et al. (2016) state that ‘Happily…this book clearly demon-
strates that…consciousness [is] a viable subject for scientific
study.’ (p. ix). But later this passage occurs in an article by
Tononi et al. ‘Despite the wealth of evidence…it is difficult to
converge on a circumscribed set of brain structures that are
‘minimally sufficient and jointly necessary’ for consciousness
[quoting Crick and Koch 2003]…. It is also important to keep
in mind that, at this stage, we have no idea whether the ele-
mentary neural units that contribute to consciousness are local
groups of neurons, such as cortical mini-columns, or individ-
ual neurons, and perhaps only neurons located in certain
layers or belonging to a particular class’ (p. 427). Towards
the end is this. ‘We still need to understand why certain struc-
tures and processes have a privileged relationship with sub-
jective experience’ (p. 445).
Nowhere is consciousness or subjective experience ex-
plained as either biologically necessary or physically plausi-
ble. The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) states that the
essential properties are that it ‘exists intrinsically’ and is ‘ex-
traordinarily informative’. It ‘exists for the experiencing sub-
ject rather than for an external observer’ (p. 445). No relation
to physical or operational terms is offered.
Neuroscientist David Poeppel says: ‘The fact is that we
have essentially no idea how the ‘stuff of thought’ relates to
the ‘stuff of meat’, in the case of speech and language, and
much the same is true in virtually all domains of higher cog-
nition’ (2015, pp. 142–143). But Poeppel does not tell us what
thought is.
In his 2014 book Michael Anderson says that ‘When neu-
roscientists start brandishing the ‘c’ word [consciousness],
there are two predictable reactions: increased public interest
and attention and increased scientific scrutiny and criticism’
(p. 109). The first involve ‘enthusiastic adherents’, the second
‘question whether we should continue wasting our energy
figuring out why the brain appears to be wasting its energy’
(ibid.). However, Anderson offers no solution (personal com-
munication); i.e. the problem is dismissed, not resolved,
which is characteristic of cognitive neuroscience.
Stanislaus Dehaene reports that ‘When I was a student in
the late 1980s, I was surprised to discover that during lab
meetings, we were not allowed to use the C-word. We all
studied consciousness in one way or another, of course, by
asking human subjects to categorize what they had seen or to
form mental images in darkness, but the word itself remained
taboo’ (2014, p. 7).1 Dehaene’s attempt to define it is this: ‘[1]
The state of wakefulness, which varies when we fall asleep or
wake up; [2] attention – the focussing of our mental resources
onto a specific piece of information; and [3] conscious access
– the fact that some of the attended information eventually
enters our awareness and becomes reportable to others’ (ibid.,
p. 8). But this merely references other words for conscious-
ness: ‘wakefulness’, ‘mental resources’, ‘attended informa-
tion’, ‘awareness’, ‘conscious access’. It does not explain in
a more primary and biologically illuminating way.
Lancelot Law Whyte wrote these prescient words in his
1960 book: ‘What does mental mean?... It is here the problem
lies.No one yet knows how properly to define ‘mental,’ perhaps
because this can only be done within a valid monism’ (p. 63).
Whyte’s words illustrate that (1) the problem does not be-
gin with identifying consciousness in the brain for it has no
1 It is still normal for manuals on neuroscience or neurobiology to make no
reference to consciousness but to assume that physical states and processes
nonetheless result in (unexplained) experience or sensation (e.g. Luo 2016).
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scientific definition. (2) There is no adequate explanation of
what a definition would be. (3) Nor what language is that
could establish it.
Given this context, the following maps the struggle to ad-
dress the topic.
The Perfidious Brain
While proponents of consciousness assume that experience is
self-revelatory they talk of the difficulty of defining it.
Dehaene, for example, says ‘The word consciousness…is
loaded with fuzzy meanings covering a broad range of com-
plex phenomena’ (2014, p. 8). But a science of consciousness
would require a clear ontological status and biological func-
tion as the brain. If the brain phenomenon is not conscious-
ness then defining it would not involve circularity because the
knowledge, which consciousness hypothetically provides,
would not exist.
A response might be: ‘But where would our knowledge
come from? I know the world is right there before me.’
Which echoes Koch’s complaint: ‘A sophisticated argument
to persuade me that my pain is delusional will not lessen its
torment one iota.’ So the first stage entails suppressing the
conviction that ‘the world is right there before me,’ and
accepting that ‘my torment’ must be explicable in scientific
terms. Otherwise the organism is elevated from biology by
unknown properties. Certainty about my pain and vision must
also be explained.2
Of course, if humans are not so elevated, they are not as is
generally supposed. Herein lies difficulty. For the freedom
effected by consciousness (‘I make decisions’) is an escape
from biophysical determinism.3 How could our behaviour be
determined yet our experience tells us otherwise? So strong is
the grip of consciousness, the brain is accused of deceiving us.
A few examples.
Not Getting to the Matter
In his book The User Illusion, subtitled Cutting Consciousness
Down to Size, Tor Nørretranders intends to demonstrate what
consciousness actually does. ‘Consciousness is depth but is
experienced as surface’ ((1991), 1998, p. 288). ‘We experience
not the raw sensory data but a simulation of the sensation….
We do not experience things themselves. We sense them. We
do not experience the sensation. We experience the simulation
of the sensation…an illusion’ (p. 289). The word ‘illusion’
applies because we take it we experience what is so between
ourselves and the world, whereas the brain has made a construct
both by working over masses of sensory data, and discarding
the irrelevant. We are presented with a comprehensible result.
So the argument goes.
But the language is crucially muddled. ‘Raw sensory data’
is related to sensory organs, but a sensation occurs as an
experiencer’s experience by definition. What Nørretranders
means to say is that sensation is not of the raw sensory data.
Instead he first says that ‘we do not experience the sensation’,
which (assuming consciousness) we do (‘we sense them’ he
says), but then he says ‘we experience the simulation of the
sensation’ which is nonsense. The appropriate question is that
given sensory data (more precisely, sensory events) are legit-
imate expressions about sensory interfaces with the physical
world, what, as physicality, is the experiencer’s experience of
sensation? i.e. what is sensation feeling supposed to be? For
without explanation, its elements (experience, sensation, feel-
ing) remain undefined—along with their host, consciousness.
And why is it an illusion—to what, to whom? Nørretranders
does not reach the heart of the matter.
Not Getting to Biology
In a footnote in his 2017 book From Bacteria to Bach and
Back (p. 335), Daniel Dennett refers to Nørretranders’ book as
published in the same year as his Consciousness Explained
(1991), so there was no mutual reference. In Chapter 14 of
Dennett’s 2017 book, titled ‘Consciousness as an Evolved
User-Illusion’, he expounds on his computer-model version
of consciousness.
‘We can list the properties of the tokens on the computer
desk-top: blue rectangular ‘files’; a black arrow-shaped
cursor; a yellow highlighted word in black Times
Roman 12-point font…. What are the corresponding
properties of these internal, re-identifiable private tokens
in our brains? We don’t know – yet…. Close your eyes
and imagine a blue capital A…. You just created a token
in your brain, but we can be sure it isn’t blue, any more
than the tokens of ‘o’ that occur in a word-processing
file are round. The tokenings occur in the activity of
neural circuits, and they have an important role to play
in directing attention, arousing associated tokens, and
modulating many cognitive activities’ (p. 347).
The term ‘user illusion’ comes from the computer industry.
Computer and brain functioning are made analogous. The
‘user’ (the human being) need not be acquaintedwith the work
2 Overturning Galen Strawson, ‘‘There occurred in the twentieth century the
most remarkable episode in the whole history of ideas – the whole history of
human thought. A number of thinkers denied the existence of something we
know with certainty to exist: consciousness, conscious experience.’’ Isaiah
Berlin Lectures, Oxford University (2017).
3 e.g. Antonio Damasio: ‘Consciousness is just the latest and most sophisti-
cated means of generating adequate responses to an environment…by making
way for the creation of novel responses in the sort of environment which an
organism has not been designed to match, in terms of automated responses’
(1999, p. 304) (slightly reconstructed) which it does by ‘the world of planning,
the world of formulation of scenarios and prediction of outcomes’ (p. 303).
Act Nerv Super
the computer does to facilitate ease of (e.g.) screen interface.
Likewise, consciousness is, as it were, the brain’s interface to
itself, the intelligible state of the brain. We can tell that be-
cause, sourced by the neural brain, the world is intelligible to
us as a mental construct.
Dennett explains consciousness by proposing it emerges
from an accumulating hierarchy of simpler physical states,
gradually increasing the range of its competence.4 (He re-
ferred to it in 1991 as a ‘virtual machine’, and still does in
2017.) The problem, however, is not, as proponents of con-
sciousness say, that Dennett has not explained consciousness
because it has some kind of being which amassing operational
circuits in a hierarchy cannot just become (e.g. David
Chalmers 1996; Ned Block, see below). It is that the brain
phenomenon (aka consciousness) has not been given a
biofunctional role. Dennett wants to demystify consciousness.
But the computer analogy is not explanatory. As with
Nørretranders, what is consciousness supposed to do that the
brain qua brain states could not? The answer requires a bio-
logical explanation, not a computer analogy (cf. Chomsky
2016, p. 29).
The Explanatory Block of Mentalism
In his 2017 book, Dennett addresses the work of Daniel
Wegner and his The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002). Here
is a relevant passage from that ‘groundbreaking’ book. ‘We
can never be sure that our thoughts cause our actions, as there
could always be causes of which we were unaware that have
produced both the thoughts and the actions…. As Nisbett and
Wilson (1977) have observed, the occurrence of a mental
process does not guarantee the individual any special knowl-
edge of the mechanism of this process. Instead, the person
seeking self-insight must employ a priori causal theories to
account for his or her own psychological operations….
Conscious will is not a direct perception of the relation but
rather a feeling based on the causal inference one makes about
the data that do become available to consciousness – the
thought and the observed act’ (pp. 66–67).
As with Nørretranders, we are in a terminological black
hole. First of all, consciousness exists but without definition.
Then, it is given attributes: ‘a mental process’, ‘knowledge’,
‘self-insight’ (i.e. introspection), the (necessarily conscious)
‘person’ who has ‘a priori causal theories’ and ‘psychological
operations’, together with ‘a feeling based on causal infer-
ence’ that ‘one [i.e. the mental subject] makes’ ‘about the data
which become available to consciousness’ with a ‘thought’
and an ‘observed act’.
Wegner’s aim is to escape the involvement of mental life in
causal activity because causality belongs to the physical
world: ‘the [physical] mechanism of the process’. But the
explanatory text wholly depends upon mental life, else how
can the nature of human being be described? But mental life,
specifically consciousness, is not addressed. The index entry
for ‘conscious mind’ sends us to this passage. ‘The definition
of will as an experience means that we are very likely to
appreciate conscious will in ourselves because we are, of
course, privy to our own experiences and are happy to yap
about them all day’ (p. 11). The ‘of course’ indicates that little
is revealed as science. Being ‘privy to our own experiences’ is
opaque. What is identified by ‘our’? Is it a sense of self, and
what is that vis-à-vis the brain? Then there is ‘own’—that
which belongs (presumably) to me. But what is myself: how
is it owned? How are we ‘privy’? How is privy-ness made
available? What is an ‘experience’?... The book concerns the
illusion of conscious will, but the foundational element, con-
sciousness (of conscious will), is never explained. It is as-
sumed in the history of the word and concept only describable
by other terms of itself.
Could Consciousness Play Tricks?
In an attempt to deal with consciousness and the notion of
qualia, or qualitative states, Dennett uses David Hume’s sem-
inal comments on causation. ‘We seem to see and hear and
feel causation every day, Hume notes’ (2017, p. 354). But
Hume said that this is a special case of the mind’s ‘‘great
propensity to spread itself on external objects (1739,
I:xiv)’…. It survives to this day in the typically unexamined
assumption that all perceptual representations must be flowing
inbound from outside’ (ibid., p. 355). But ‘you can’t find
intrinsic sweetness by examining the molecular structure of
glucose: look instead to the details in the brain of sweetness
seekers’ (pp. 355–356). This is the brain’s ‘benign illusion’.’
And our brains ‘have tricked us into having the conviction…
that there seems to be an intrinsically wonderful but otherwise
indescribable property [i.e. qualia] in some edible things:
sweetness’ (ibid., p. 356).5
The phrase ‘our brains trick us’ is now a common expres-
sion. Nick Chater, who claims there is no unconscious mind,
reprises the arguments. ‘So, except in a rather uninteresting
sense, we aren’t really conscious of numbers, apples, people,
or anything else – we’re conscious of our interpretations of
sensory experience (including inner speech) and nothing
more. In this light, the tower of levels of consciousness, each
built on the last, collapses. It is one more trick played on us by
the brain’ (2018, p. 185).
4 As Dennett says in his 1991 book, ‘The way to discharge an intelligence that
is too big for our theory is to replace it with an ultimately mechanical fabric of
semi-independent semi-intelligences acting in concert’ (p. 251).
5 Kant incorporated the notion of causality into the mind’s Transcendental
Categories of Understanding in the First Critique (1781, 1787), responding
to Hume’s critique.
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But is it likely the brain, as consciousness, plays tricks on
us? (Which ‘us’?) What possible survival benefit could that
entail?
Current Non-scientific Nomenclature
Developing a scientific theory of the brain phenomenon is of a
different order from a theory of the physical universe
(heliocentrism, molecular chemistry, quantum field theory).
Although humans and other creatures may be purely physical,
theories about ourselves are generated by our brain’s capacity
for theorizing, and it is that which requires scrupulous
exploration.
Explanation Which Does Not Explain
In an article titled ‘Consciousness and Conceptual Clarity’,
Ned Block says that: ‘The lesson to be drawn is that isolating
consciousness in the brain may depend more on being clear
about what we are looking for than on massive investments in
new technology’ (2015, p. 175). He follows with a paraphrase
of Kant. ‘Concepts without data are empty; data without con-
cepts are blind’ (ibid.). This is a seminal point. Does Block
achieve it?
He illustrates his point about concept making by contrast-
ing Dehaene’s theory of global broadcasting with the results
of experimental data from Wolfgang Einhäuser’s lab (Frässle
et al. 2014).
Dehaene, Jean-Pierre Changeux and colleagues (2011) ad-
vanced a global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness,6
in which neural coalitions in the rear of the brain (the primary
visual cortices) compete for dominance, the winners linking
long range with the prefrontal cortex where cognitive functions
are located, generating feedback to the visual cortices and
thence ignition of the workspace. The workspace becomes
widely available to other brain processes. For Dehaene et al.
the workspace is consciousness, i.e. it is cognitive functioning.
However, the Einhäuser’s lab experiments on binocular rivalry,
rather than depending on the subject’s account of their
(cognitive) experience, introduced eye-tracking technology
which identified eye movements (left or right). A response
resulted from subjects pressing a button without conscious cog-
nition having taken place because they were not required to
report it. It was therefore not associated with the global broad-
casting theory; frontal processing had not occurred (Block
2015, pp. 174–175). Thus phenomenal consciousness (Block
1995), i.e. conscious activity, was apparently identified without
cognition. Block termed cognitive activity access conscious-
ness. As Block says in the (2015) article, ‘Lamme (2003),
Zeki, and I do not think that phenomenal consciousness has
no information processing role. We think that consciousness
greases the wheels of cognition but can obtain without it’ (p.
167). In other words, access consciousness (pressing the button
from eye-tracking) is not conscious, but is sowhen phenomenal
consciousness is also active. What ‘greasing the wheels’ entails
is not discussed.
These theoreticians have different accounts about a suppos-
edly fundamental biological construct. But neither tells us
what being conscious does, i.e. why it is necessary beyond
the causal power of physical brain states. We are not even told
by Block what consciousness is, ontologically. He quotes
Dehaene concerning his (Block’s) position. ‘The hypothetical
concept of qualia…will be viewed as a peculiar idea of the
prescientific era’ (2014, p. 221). But since Dehaene does not
tell us why ‘we’ as consciousness are an ignition of the brain
rather than just physical processes operating, there is no guide
for the matter.7
Is the Brain Phenomenon Really Consciousness?
There is another dimension. Why does consciousness exist at
all? Before Freud, Nietzsche stated that ‘For the longest time,
conscious thought was considered thought itself. Only now
does the truth dawn on us that by far the greatest part of our
spirit’s activity remains unconscious and unfelt’ (1974, p.
262). Under Freud’s aegis, this generated a profound change
in human self-conception in the twentieth century. The causal
soul was replaced by anatomical function, though Freud failed
to establish how. Nietzsche had an additional insight (cf.
Hume/Kant). ‘‘Explanation’ is what we call it, but it is ‘de-
scription’ that distinguishes us from older stages of knowledge
and science…. How could we explain anything? We operate
only with things that do not exist’ (ibid., p. 172)—i.e. mental
constructs. This is what Nørretranders et al. aim at: the illusory
nature of consciousness. (Use of ‘explain’ in this text assumes
Nietzsche’s point.)
However, John Bargh said in 2005, ‘If we are capable of
doing something effectively through nonconscious means,
that something would likely not be the primary function for
which we evolved consciousness’ (p. 52). But Bargh
hypothesises that ‘metacognitive consciousness [i.e. being
aware of ‘my’ conscious content and therefore being able to
influence it] is the workplace where one can assemble and
combine the various components of complex-motor skills.
This is a development of the human species because [quoting
Donald 2001, p. 8] ‘whereas most other species depend upon
their built-in demons to do their mental work for them, we can
build our own demons’’ (p. 53). (The tenor of the Baars/
Dehaene workspaces.) Bargh continues: ‘The purpose of
6 Derived from the global workspace theory of consciousness developed by
Bernard Baars (e.g. 1997), as acknowledged in the text.
7 Dehaene et al. retain this position in 2017. ‘What we call ‘consciousness’
results from specific types of information-processing computations, physically
realized by the hardware of the brain.’ Also introduced is self-monitoring.
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consciousness – why it evolved – may be for the assemblage
of complex non-conscious skills…. People have the capacity
of building ever more automatic ‘demons’ that fit their own
environment, needs and purposes. As William James (1890)
argued, consciousness drops out of the processes where it is
no longer needed’ (ibid.).8
This has ironic consequences for psychology, for ‘the
evolved purpose of consciousness turns out to be the creation
of ever more complex nonconscious processes’ since, accord-
ing to Bargh, consciousness has a ‘limited capacity nature’
(referencing Baumeister et al. 1998), (ibid.).
But that implies psychology or cognitive science cannot be
neuroscience’s sought-for descriptive account of brain func-
tion, for psychology depends upon the causal properties of
mental states—seeing, feeling, thinking, willing, motivation.
Indeed, Peter Carruthers, in his Interpretive Sensory Access
Theory (ISA), and from extensive analysis, says: ‘If there are
no conscious decisions then…there is no…conscious agen-
cy…. If there is no conscious agency, then there are no con-
sciousness agents’ (2011, p. 379). But he does not then ex-
punge consciousness. He avoids commitments regarding its
nature (ibid., p. 373).
None of this solves the underlying question, why what has
been supposed as consciousness need exist. But authors do not
break free from it. The question remains: Why does all brain
work not occur without consciousness, particularly when it is
apparently so limited?
Does Consciousness Make Sense?
Moving forward, David Melnikoff with John Bargh in 2018,
debunk the conscious/unconscious typology of mental pro-
cesses. Type 1 is efficient, unintentional, uncontrollable and
unconscious. Type 2 is inefficient, intentional, controllable
and conscious. They say ‘This…typology has grown more
popular with each passing decade. In just the past 5 years it
has shaped empirical and theoretical work’ on numerous areas
of research, e.g. emotion, religiosity, interview bias, judge-
ment and decision making. They continue: ‘Popularity of this
magnitude is typically reserved for ideas that have withstood
decades of conceptual scrutiny and empirical vetting, so it is
no surprise that the Type 1/Type 2 distinction has a reputation
among many researchers of being uncontroversial, even axi-
omatic. But this reputation, it turns out, is undeserved.’On the
contrary ‘There is no evidence that processing features cluster
together into two groups; and there is substantial evidence
they do not.’ Each of the areas is explored in the light of
experimental research. They say, with some urgency, ‘It is
time that we…come to terms with these issues. With organi-
sations like the World Bank and Institute of Medicine now
endorsing our highly speculative and frequently misleading
typology, we cannot afford to wait.’
They point out that with four sets of binary features in each
of the two types, there are 24 possible combinations. However,
the typology proposes only two, leaving 14 non-applicable.
Unlikely, they claim. Intentional goes with conscious and con-
trollable presumably on the assumption that consciousness has
the power of intending and controlling what is done.
Unintentional, unconscious and uncontrollable are the inverse.
Here is one of their examples. ‘‘A bat and a ball cost $1.10
in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost?’ People almost invariably generate an initial
answer of 10 cents, but the correct answer is 5 cents.’ The
immediacy of the response is uncontrolled (Type 1) while at
the same time is consciously intended (Type 2), thus obvious-
ly breaking the typology. It is not that the wrong answer is
caused by the failure to work it out correctly but rather that the
conscious intention is to answer but is uncontrolled
(unconscious).
One might say (which the authors do not) that the wrong
answer is generated unconsciously (Type 1), which is why it is
uncontrolled and, as it were, passes seamlessly through con-
sciousness (Type 2) without further analysis (i.e. it is not con-
trolled). For the immediate answer to the question is ‘obvious’
from the question’s phrasing ($1.10 cost and $1 more-than,
leaving 10 cents). Further thought is required to get the right
answer.
But is thinking conscious, or is it, as Bargh hypothesised in
2005, a more elaborate unconscious activity pre-generated via
consciousness? If so, here is an alternative analysis. While a
correct answer might seem to result from consciousness (Type
2), since it evidently passes through it, it is the unconscious
that can generate a delayed but ultimately efficient correct
answer (Type 1), which would align with the typology if it
too was uncontrolled (Type 1). That is, consciousness has no
immediate impact at all despite the experimental assumption it
is intended. Thus the typology fails, as the authors are aware
but do not analyse in this example.
They summarise: ‘Given that there are at least three disso-
ciable ways in which a process can be unconscious, it makes
little conceptual sense to talk about consciousness as a unitary
processing feature that can co-occur with other features.’ This
again undermines the disciplines of psychology and cognitive
science, for what is demonstrated is the total absence of a
viable mentalist vocabulary (conscious/unconscious) related
to scientific concepts.
Summary
Mental life is opaque (Carruthers’word) and problematic rath-
er than precise and relevant to neuroscience. It lacks scientific
definitions. Its function has no agreed interpretation. It is di-
visive since either our very being appears to demand it (Koch,8 These ideas already exist in Nietzsche’s writings.
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Strawson), or scientific impetus forces implausible solutions
(Dennett, Dehaene, Tononi). Indeed, Dehaene says that ‘no
experiment will…show how the hundred billion neurons in
the human brain fire at the moment of conscious perception.
Onlymathematical theory can explain how the mental reduces
to the neural’ (2014, pp. 162–163). In a similar vein David
Poeppel says: ‘Bridging virtually all domains of higher cog-
nition and neurobiology in an explanatory fashion requires the
formulation of computationally explicit linking hypotheses’
(2015, pp. 143, slightly rearranged). Mathematics is a vital
tool. However, it is the mentalist assumption that is the source
of the crisis in theorising, not the absence of computation. As
Bargh and Melnikoff say, the current conscious/unconscious
schemata is ‘systematically thwarting scientific progress.’ The
following is a brief outline of an alternative.
The Theory of Brain-Sign
Science requires an account of the brain phenomenon with a
plausible physical schema. While mind, soul and spirit ad-
dress the mystery of human being, they are linked to notions
of divinity; in the case of mind, what Paul Churchland dubbed
‘folk psychology’ (1981).
Here is the key analytical issue, referenced in ‘Current
Non-scientific Nomenclature’. We are the object of scientific
enquiry (mind/consciousness) and the means of enquiry (as
mind/consciousness). Consciousness, as means and object, is
presupposed without identifying whether consciousness is ac-
tually consciousness (‘Is the Brain Phenomenon Really
Consciousness?’ and ‘Does Consciousness Make Sense?’).
Is the ‘we’ that enquires, apparent in Koch’s cry, a scientific
entity? ‘A sophisticated argument to persuademe that my pain
is delusional will not lessen its torment one iota.’ Koch does
not justify the ‘me’ scientifically. It is a subject harbouring the
divinity (the knower knowing) within the mentalist lexicon.
Actually, there are three topics to be dealt with, not two.
They are (1) the function of our ‘presence’ in the universe, i.e.
what are ‘we’ as the brain phenomenon? (2) The physical
nature of that phenomenon fulfilling a coherent biophysical
function, and therefore (3) the physical actuality of the brain
phenomenon.
What is required is a way of reconstructing concepts and
evidence so that a plausible scientific model appears from the
ruins of a prescientific construct. Of course, given the history,
this will require a fundamental change in our self-conception.
Locating Brain-Sign
Currently, and for thousands of years, humans have taken
communication with others for granted because the world is
immediately available as seen. Given this is impossible, for
the brain is isolated in each organism’s skull denying it direct
access to the world, consciousness, as a theory, provides the
resolution by positing seeing and hearing (or the sense of
seeing and hearing, cf. Nørretranders). But if consciousness
is a myth, how could brains communicate about the world?
The answer is by signification, for signs are inherently
physical. Consider the death’s-head hawkmoth. The
European variety can move about devouring honey in the hive
of honeybees because it emits chemicals (a pheromone)
whose properties are akin to those of bees, and it is thus ‘un-
noticed’ (Moritz et al. 1991). The sign, the chemistry, does not
facilitate communal action but it does render moths insensible
to bees. More relevantly, a tiny brown pufferfish, identified
off the coast of Japan, creates in 7 days elaborate symmetrical
wheel-shaped designs in the sand with its fins to attract a
female to lay eggs in the middle which it then fertilizes
(Barrington et al. 2014, pp. 184–187). The sign engenders
collective action which aids the species survival. How do
these creatures know to do this? They do not. Their actions
are generated by Donald’s ‘built-in demons’ developed in
evolutionary time. Dennett (2017) refers to this activity as
competence, not comprehension.
But there is crucial differentiation in organisms’ biophysi-
cal sign usage. Bargh/Donald state it is between built-in de-
mons and humans who ‘can build [their] own demons’. The
use of pheromone chemistry by insects (and others) to gener-
ate cooperative action, or to defend or deceive, is well-docu-
mented. This sign communicates at a comparatively primitive
biological level, as well as for humans. But it is functionally
constrained. More elaborately, honeybees convey to others
the route to pollen by the angular relation to the sun (and other
factors) in their ‘dance’ signs. This is accomplished by altering
receivers’ brain states via intervening electromagnetic radia-
tion and compression waves. But whilst more elaborate than
pheromone release, the function remains precise. The dance is
an instruction. The pufferfish employs further complexity, for
whilst the wheel design is an instruction if followed, it appears
to have an ‘acceptance-or-not’ role for the female. Moreover,
the sandscape is modified to achieve a result, which is a re-
markable technical development.
An evolutionary transition is taking place. Organism coop-
eration moves from instruction (molecular or behavioural) to
an operation which is neither genetically preestablished or
mimicked. It demands continual adaptive behaviour, as in
one person passing a cup of coffee to another, i.e. without
predetermined responses. Dynamic interaction. Not only is
this more elaborate, it needs a means/mechanism to facilitate
it. That is brain-sign.
The Missing Link—Causal Orientation
The brain phenomenon, brain-sign, represents the world and
the response of the organism to the world; what mentalism
supposes as seeing and emotion. But (mental) seeing and
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emotion are held to spring from the physical brain as different
kinds of entities from the brain and each other. Mentalism is
prolific, Dehaene’s ‘fuzzymeanings covering a broad range of
complex phenomena.’ Seeing, hearing, sensing, smelling,
thinking, judging, discriminating, pain, depression, excite-
ment, boredom, passion, shame, love, contempt, guilt, hope,
confidence, etc. These are understood, not merely as personal
attitudes, but, hypothetically, states of the mind/brain.
Brain-sign theory, however, has a straightforward explana-
tion for the origin of them all. For something determines what
segment of the world (including the body) is to be represented.
Assuming the brain itself causes the organism to act, it is the
brain’s immediate causal orientation towards the world (i.e.
the brain’s activated structures and electro-chemical status). In
the case of seeing, what causes what appears are the specific
elements of the world of the current causal orientation, includ-
ing the organism itself. (Which is why the world can be seen
in different ways depending on the brain’s causal orientation.)
But the brain does not see because its causal orientation has
already determined what will happen. The brain phenomenon
is the brain’s interpretation of its causal orientation towards
the world as that world. (Which is supported by the experi-
ments of Benjamin Libet (e.g. 1983) in which a subject’s
‘chosen’ action neurally precedes awareness of it.) But why
would it do that if the image is not involved in its action?
Brain-sign is a means/mechanism by which brains jointly
establish the domain of collective action from the successive
causal orientations. If A passes B a cup of coffee, each brain
continually interprets its shifting causal orientation so signify-
ing the cup and the ongoing interaction within the local envi-
ronment. The cup is identified between hands and bodies from
the time of inception to receipt. Thus brain-sign is not an
external instruction one to another, as the bee dance or
pufferfish wheel. It is the content of the in-the-world transac-
tion which each causal brain must continually establish to
effect it. This includes, of course, the ‘sense’ of each individ-
ual being in that world.
Still, the question might be asked: If causality belongs in
the physical brain operation, why do brains have to signify the
world in which that operation takes place? The answer is that
both the complexity and precision of interaction demands sus-
taining what the transaction is about. Brain-sign is the mutual
reference for the brain/body action, though it is obviously not
the actual world (cf. Kant, Nørretranders, Dennett, et al.). In
action, they are one biophysical unit, not two or more.
Foundation and Evolution
Brain-sign did not develop so that complex interactions could
take place. That would counter evolutionary theory. The hy-
pothesis is that the internally generated representation of the
world and responses to it result from the increasing causal
possibilities of evolving brains in relation to the world,
particularly in vertebrate species. In numerous situations, rep-
resentations became sustained as the world-object of causal
brain structures—and thence, under natural selection, come to
act as a communication medium/mechanism, greatly
expanding possible behavioural complexity. Representations
do not add to causality for the organism itself: they become the
communicative means of the interaction process.9 For the
pufferfish, the wheel pattern is communication in the mating
act. It operates in the time-sequence of mating. However, in-
creasing levels of cooperative interaction in mating behaviour
occur. Many species of birds, for example, build nests for egg
depository which is interactive, though the female is often
dominant. In evolutionary time interaction occurs with much
more advanced levels of reciprocation—for elephants, dol-
phins, apes and humans. Thus Bargh’s underminings of con-
sciousness are given a scientific reconstruction, and science
itself a plausible physical genesis (i.e. with no conscious/
unconscious dichotomy).
This is a new domain of biological explanation. Credibility
may be enhanced by a biological parallel between brain-sign
as representational states of world objects, and the cellular
‘colouration’ and design of the chameleon and cuttlefish, or
the surface markings of butterflies acting as deception. Other
body structures, too, in which aspects of the world are ‘mim-
icked’ for defence, for example, stick and leaf insects, the
Phasmatodea (Butler 2012). Brain structures are certainly
more elaborate than body surface structures, not least because
they continually change, as does causal orientation. How the
brain mechanism is constructed is as yet unspecified. Tononi
et al. say this about consciousness (above); but they have the
more intractable problem of explaining consciousness itself.
Coincident to the neural representations of the world, brain
responses to the world are internalised for signification (so-
called emotion, etc.). These are temporally linked to world
representations but are also sourced from the organism’s caus-
al orientation.
Brain-Sign: an Outline
Causal orientation is the crucial link from brain to brain-sign.
Organisms do not act from seeing, thinking, feeling or belief.
They have no motives for what they do. These explanations
are brain generated without scientific constraint: they are pre-
scientific. Brain-sign theory initiates a new biophysical ac-
count of organisms. Here are fundamental elements of brain-
sign structure.
9 By contrast with, e.g. Tomasello 2014; see Clapson 2016. Also this dis-
counts references Dennett makes (2017, p. 342) to McFarland (1989),
Dawkins and Krebs (1978) and others, in which the ability not to reveal the
organism’s ‘current state to competitive organisms’ is as significant as the
ability to communicate. For generating representations is not required for that
behavioural operation, nor is it explained how representations could be causal,
i.e. the mind-body problem.
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i Categories-of-the-world
j The biophysical marker
k Categories-of-interaction
l Brain-sign language
Perception Redesigned
From infancy, the organism explores the world. But the infant
does not learn to see. The brain/body becomes acquainted
with objects by establishing, in neural structures (termed as-
semblies or networks), causal responses to surfaces, substan-
tiality, construction, behaviour characteristics, native environ-
ment and use. By sensory input and interaction with the world
(eyes, ears, bodily contact, tongue), and thence brain associa-
tion, neural instruction about action in the world is built. As
gradually developed, the brain interprets its causal orientation
towards the world thus generating brain-signs—portrayals of
the world and the organism’s response to it, which signify in
joint behaviour. Parents and children begin to engage beyond
purely autonomic activity.
As a theory, mentalism’s seeming to see is replaced by an
‘invisible’ capacity for interneural communicative acquain-
tance with the world implicit in everyday behaviour. It is not
apparent to our lived lives. Thus the account moves from
conscious/unconscious duality to causal orientation and
interneural communication—the sought-for scientific monism
(ref. Lancelot Law Whyte). Brain-signs are part of the organ-
ism’s survival arsenal.
The sense of seeing (and other senses) is the signification of
the vast assembly of neural structures that enable behavioural
and cooperative possibilities of the brain and body.10 It is a
communicative shorthand for the brain’s operational capacity
in numerous potential situations. What is predominant in ‘see-
ing’ is the image. But the organism’s so-called sense of seeing
is actually the brain’s outward act of neural communication,
whether another organism is present or not. The ‘sense of
seeing’ an apple conveys causal possibilities in relation to
apples as physicality: eatability, grown on trees, makes cider,
what Eve passed to Adam, and so on, the particularities de-
pendent on the brain’s immediate causal orientation. So, a
signified wall entails the behavioural feature of not walking
into it. The brain will not be communicating actually if no
other organism is present, but its biological status is commu-
nicative. Thus the mentalist terms ‘consciousness’,
‘experience’, ‘awareness’ etc. have no underlying neural as-
sociations. Brain-sign theory states that there is nothing in the
world the brain can know (cf. Nietzsche et al.).
A luminous example of brain-sign’s improvement over psy-
chology occurs with the notion of attention. In the well-known
experiments of Daniel Simons and Christopher Chabris (1999,
2010), individuals concentrating on a video game of basketball
fail to notice a person in a gorilla suit appearing, chest
pounding, and departing. The phenomenon was given the term
‘inattentional blindness’. It even occurs if viewers are warned
of an irrelevant event beforehand (Chabris and Simons 2010).
Brain-sign theory rejects inattentional blindness: the brain sees
nothing so it cannot be blind. The brain’s causal orientation is
the basketball game which the resulting brain-sign signifies.
This straightforward neuroscientific explanation replaces what
has seemed a mental fallibility. Indeed, the flyer for the
Chabris/Simon 2010 book states that ‘Our minds don’t work
the way we think they do.’ Yet the mind is retained as a valid
entity—ironically personifying the flyer. Similarly, Carruthers
refers to this experiment in an interview (2018) but, despite
asserting that ‘consciousness is not what we generally think it
is,’ he maintains it, so fixated is human culture.
So returning to ‘The Theory of Brain-Sign’, we can say that
(1) ‘Our presence in the universe’ is a biophysical condition of
neural communication; (2) ‘The physical ontology of the phe-
nomenon’ is that of a sign; and (3) ‘The physical actuality of
the brain phenomenon’ is structures and conditions of the
brain, as yet to be determined. Of course, brain-signs between
organisms are not identical. They are adequate for a bio-
communicative role.
‘Perceptions’ in their many forms (sight, hearing, touch,
taste) are termed, as brain-sign content, categories-of-the-
world for obvious reasons. They are not input to cognitive
mechanics (Kant’s engine of reason) or any form of ‘what
it’s like’ (Nagel 1974). They are output serving communica-
tion about the world of causal orientation. The organism does
not perceive: the world comes into being as brain-sign for
interneural communication.
*
It is appropriate to place the brain-sign account within the
literature. (If the reader wishes to continue the brain-sign nar-
rative, skip to the next section.) Firstly, the use of the term
‘seeing’ by contrast with ‘perception’. Whilst they are used
interchangeably, perception is often associated with a more
complex condition. Jan Koenderink and Joachim Krueger, in
their 2017 article, express this difference. The word ‘seeing’,
or ‘vision’ as the authors say, assumes the world is directly
and accurately present to the observer. ‘The central problem
[for rationality] is the present emphasis on inverse optics – the
[supposedly] objective nature of objects and environments [as
seen].’ By contrast, they propose the world is a construct in
which the organism’s species, and thus sensory modalities, are
incorporated together with its particular history (‘expectations,
10 Edmund Husserl developed his notion of the life-world (Lebenswelt) in
which we exist in the world with its objects around us—the experience we
take as normal and simply assume. His last published book, Crisis ((1954),
1989), influenced by Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time ((1927), 1962),
distinguishes the experienced world from the scientific account of the world.
Phenomenology sets out to describe the experienced characteristics. Brain-
sign, as the portrayal of the world from the brain’s causal orientation, is sci-
entifically founded and eschews phenomenology as scientifically incoherent.
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conjectures, and theories’) which affect the perceiving state
(cf. Nørretranders, et al.).
Brain-sign theory certainly agrees the brain phenomenon is
a construct: it derives from the causal orientation of the organ-
ism’s brain. But whilst distancing their account from
rationality’s non-biological ‘all-seeing eye’, they preserve
mentalism and its elevation from the physical. No explanation
is offered for its causality.
The second and linked topic is enaction or enactivism. As
John Stewart puts it, ‘‘The world’ as it can be diversely known
by living organisms from bacteria to contemporary humans is
actually brought about, ‘enacted’, by the cognitive organism
itself’ (2014, p. 27). This is the so-called embodied mind (or
cognition, the topic presaged in the book by Varela et al.
1991). Alva Noё, a pioneer of the approach, says that ‘At
the ground of our encounter with…different objects – appear-
ances in one modality or another – is sensorimotor skill’ (2004
p. 107). Being embodied means that mental states are not
disembodied entities (Descartes) or with irreducible qualita-
tive properties (Chalmers). Appearances result directly from
bodily actions in the world.
Brain-sign theory sympathises. There are no causal mental
states and brain-signs are generated from brain/body causality.
Moreover, Stewart comments that ‘the majority of epistemo-
logical positions…share a commitment to objectivism’ and
this makes enactivism ‘an unusual point of view’. However,
neither Noё nor Stewart explain the biophysical function of
world appearances. Why are they there at all? Stewart even
says, ‘We humans are profoundly social beings’ (ibid.) with-
out arriving at brain-sign theory. This characterises a diverse
literature,11 which probably accounts for its failure to gain
unified assent—Thomas Kuhn’s ‘normal science’ (1962).
This failure is mentioned by Matthew Cobb in his 2020
book (p. 251) in relation to the book by neuroscientist
Gyӧrgy Buzsáki (2019). Buzsáki, working in the action-
based genre, says ‘Cognition can be understood only as a
social phenomenon that transcends the brain of an individual'
(p .228). But his fascinating account is still consciousness-
bound, not brain-sign.
The Subject (I, Self) Redesigned
For mentalism, the I is crucial for experience, and is concep-
tually central; hence Koch’s ‘my pain is [not] delusional’. But
Koch’s discomfort is a communicative neural event. The caus-
al orientation from which ‘pain’ is interpreted signifies the
organism should do something about it. This was Descartes’
explanation, but he proposed it was divinely sourced (effec-
tively endorsed by Chalmers’ ‘hard problem’ and Block’s
phenomenal consciousness). ‘Pain’ per se is a category-of-
the-world. The response to pain, the ‘discomfort’, will be ad-
dressed in the next section.
In brain-sign communication, each organism is identified
as unique. As content, ‘pain’ is conjoined with the biological
identification of that organism, the biophysical marker, which
replaces the mental subject. Marker and ‘pain’ exist together
as biophysical communication. Koch’s ‘sense of himself
experiencing pain’ can be helpfully identified by others in a
shared world, neurally generated. Koch does not experience
this fact for neither Koch nor pain exist in the mentalist sense
(The Perfidious Brain).
Kant is partly right when he says that ‘Through this I…
nothing is represented than a transcendental subject of the
thoughts [or pain] = X’ (1933 p. 331). But Kant was expressly
talking of a non-physical mind that thinks or has pain. Brains
are physical; they do not think or have pain.
But how do we account for thinking about ourselves or our
thoughts—meta-consciousness? How do we address knowing
we are in pain? Daniel Wegner claims we (our selves) are
‘privy to our own experiences’. Certainly, we seem to think
about things in the world and in ourselves, which are notion-
ally quite different, because the object is in different places—
outside and inside. But this is fallacious. There is no inner
world: there is one physical world of which brains are part,
and brain-signs are physical structures.
Our so-called inner life is interneural communication,
whether we suppose we have pain (‘feeling’) or knowwe have
it (‘reflection’). The construct of brain-sign is the biophysical
marker plus the location of content in the only place it could
be—the body I am (in Koch’s case a tooth). ‘Becoming aware
of it’, so-called, is neurally communicating it. Saying ‘I have
pain in my jaw’ follows the initial brain-sign and differs from
it. The intent of saying it (before it is said) is not a mental
reflection (or realisation) of being in pain. I.e. the supposition
we think about ourselves as a self experiencing mental entity
results from the theoretical structure of mentalism forced on us
from infancy without question.12 So, beyond the contortion of
our face, another brain can identify and associate with (quasi-
replicate as signification) our brain’s condition, when told,
because brain-sign creates a common world. This is neither
empathy as a dualist mental function, nor simulation theory as
a mind state. But the latter is in-tune with brain-sign theory.13
Thus the philosophical notion of apperception (Descartes,
Leibnitz, Kant)—the awareness of self being aware of the
world—is superseded by the neuroscientific account of
interneural communication. It occurs in our dog/cat (and other
creatures) and is mistakenly supposed as mental selfhood. A
creature ‘recognizing itself’ in a mirror (dolphins,
11 For example, Embodiment, Enaction, and Culture (Durt et al. 2017).
12 As Will Storr puts it: ‘The controlled hallucination inside the silent, black
vault of our skulls that we experience as reality is warped by faulty informa-
tion. But because the distorted reality is the only reality we know, we just
cannot see where it’s gone wrong’ (Storr 2019, p. 62).
13 See, e.g. Carruthers 2011, p. 224 and below.
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chimpanzees) is not recognising a mental self. It has an addi-
tional behavioural ability towards its body. Inside its head, it
still signifies its interaction with others.
Here is another example. We are startled by an unbidden
and very strange ‘thought’. And, as if peering into the depths,
‘we’ say to ‘ourselves’: ‘How could I have thought that bizarre
thing?’ But just as the bizarre thought occurs spontaneously,
so does the questioning ‘reflection’. However, it is not an
introspective action by a mental I questioning a hidden
(unconscious) interior producing bizarre thoughts.
The bizarre thought is a brain-sign construct from the
brain’s immediate causal orientation. It is discontinuous with
prior brain events. The brain constantly organizes and ex-
presses its operation. Its processes are not controlled (or
accessed) by a conscious or rational mind.14 But since the
event is unrelated to prior causal orientations, the brain gen-
erates a communicative brain-sign noting its unrelated char-
acter. Because brain-signs function communicatively, the sup-
posedly reflective event is, in principle, still communication
with others. It is formed with the biophysical marker and a
new causal orientation pointing towards the construction of
the bizarre ‘thought’ by a fictive self/mind. The prior ‘thought’
is not coincident with it but, in these following brain-sign
constructs, it hovers behind and before it temporarily. The
notion of self-inquiry does not describe the brain’s operation,
for the biophysical marker does no work beyond identifying
this organism.
This description makes three points. (1) The biophysical
marker is not a mental subject that can actively inquire into
its mind. (2) Having identified the role of brain-sign, there is
no question of ownership of thoughts by a mental subject. (3)
As brain-sign, we are the brain’s explanation of its state which
functions as the common world with others.
Certainly often no communication takes place. But the
brain does not discriminate in its autonomic creation of
brain-sign for it does not know what it is doing. Over-
production is characteristic of biological processes.
*
Now again it is important briefly to distinguish this account
from others in the literature. It has become fairly common to
state that the brain makes up stories, significantly influenced
by the work of Michael Gazzaniga on split-brain patients (his
‘left brain interpreter’, e.g. 2011; also on consciousness,
2018). But in doing so the brain has no access to any kind
of (transcendent) knowledge beyond the conditions of its own
neural functioning. Here is an account from Nick Chater.
‘Our flow of conscious thought, including our explana-
tions of our own and others’ behaviour, are creations of
the moment, not reports of (or even speculations about)
a chain of inner mental events. Our mind is continually
interpreting, justifying and making sense of our own
behaviour, just as we make sense of the people around
us, or characters in fiction’ (2018, p. 6). ‘There is no
inner world’ (ibid., p. 8).
Brain-sign theory agrees the brain phenomenon is a crea-
tion of the moment and the brain generates an account of itself
(further below). That there are no unconscious mental states is
certain for none are conscious. But Chater’s mind and con-
sciousness are given no biophysical credence, rendering
‘interpreting, justifying and making sense’ gratuitous. In par-
ticular, the conscious subject is completely absent. So to
whom is ‘our’ behaviour made sense, and how does that hap-
pen? Surely sentences occur. ‘Looking at the page in front of
me as I type, I have the feeling that I see words everywhere’
(ibid., p. 41). But this I has no scientific validation. It is simply
assumed because it is how one talks (or types).
In a somewhat similar way, Dennett persists in not explaining
consciousness whilst continuing to use the term. The issue is his
fixation on language. He says, according to Patricia Churchland,
that ‘without language, an animal is not conscious. That includes
nonlinguistic humans.’ (2013, p. 204.) She demurs (after
Panksepp 2010): ‘Being conscious enables the acquisition of
language, not the other way round’ (ibid., p. 205).
Indeed, Dennett does not explain the conscious subject, the
self. His view in 1991, repeated since, is that ‘If you think of
yourself as a center of narrative gravity…your existence de-
pends upon the persistence of that narrative…which could
theoretically survive many switches of medium’ including
(apparently) immortality if your name, the ‘center’, is in print
(p. 430, emphasis added). You are simply information. Thus is
consciousness wiped out by his inapt computer analogy.
In brain-sign theory, the biophysical marker replaces the
conscious subject (there is no consciousness) and endorses
Churchland’s claim about animals and nonlinguistic humans.
For example, she proposes that ‘when my dog Duff sees me
packing my suitcase and looks downcast…he is feeling the
sadness of imminent separation…probably similar to my
own’ (ibid., p. 249). The problem for Churchland is that ‘feel-
ing sad’ is scientifically unexplained.
On the other hand, Peter Carruthers, denier of conscious agen-
cy, says that ‘While selves exist, they…should be thought to
comprise all of the mental states…within the agent (the vast
majority of which are unconscious)’ (2011, p. 380). (Note the
conflict with Chater.) But by not eliminating consciousness and
saying it is not epiphenomenal, he commits the self to vacuity.
Emotions, etc., Redesigned
Another element of brain-sign is categories-of-interaction. By
contrast with world representations, these express the organ-
ism’s response to the world (cf. ‘Foundation and Evolution’).
14 For Kant, the ‘considered’ self of reflection (the ‘empirical’ I) is an ordinary
representation, not a manifestation of the transcendental I of consciousness.
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They also result from the brain’s interpretation of its causal
orientation and coincide with categories-of-the-world.
Mentalism, as a theory, states that if a lion appears before
us we see it and feel fear. Brain-sign theory says we do not see
it or feel fear. The brain and body react, but they do so purely
as physical structures which includes signification to facilitate
interneural communication about the world and the body’s
response to it. Whilst the complexity of language is a distinc-
tion between humans and other creatures, humans are not
distinct from (many) other vertebrate creatures in the genera-
tion of brain-sign (Patricia Churchland and her dog).
As a high-level generality, categories-of-the-world are gen-
erated from activity in the neocortex; categories-of-interaction
from the limbic system, the amygdala being a prime locus.
The limbic system is older phylogenetically, but these two
areas are influential on each other. That ‘emotion interacts
with cognition has become a fairly well accepted notion’
states Luiz Pessoa (2013, p. 2).
Both categories derive from the causal orientation, so while
an aim of neuroscience should be the identification of where and
how brain-sign is located, it is equally necessary to determine
where and how causal orientation occurs. The implication is that
the brain’s causal status has states of fast recurring reportability
from which brain-sign is derived.15 This must be a condition
with identifiable physical characteristics, by contrast with con-
sciousness where neural assemblies are representationally intel-
ligent (by unspecified means) and, as it were, glow, feel, sense
and emote (cf. Tononi et al. 2016; Dehaene 2014—as above).
Koch says ‘I feel the pain’. How canmatter feel pain? Or be
upset about it? Brain-sign theory resolves this because ‘we
are’ a neural construct, not a mental event. States of
(supposed) anger, adoration, envy, gratitude, serve interneural
communication directly and are not merely behavioural atti-
tudes. They do so because, as signs, they are a common brain
occurrence, which is a tacit justification for their role. Antonio
Damasio says: ‘The thing to marvel at…is the similarity not
the difference [between organisms in emotional expression]’
(1999, p. 53). However, his subsequent statement is that ‘emo-
tions produce quite reasonable behaviors’ (ibid., p. 54—
emphasis added). But the physical generator of an organism’s
behaviour is not an emotion; it is its causal orientation from
which brain-sign derives. This renders brain science tractable.
The associated behaviour fits into biologically determinable
and classifiable structures.
Here is an example. Activated adrenalin (epinephrine) en-
ergises the body’s condition in blood circulation for rapid
response (Luo 2016, p. 353). So, is the sense of fear the sole
result of adrenalin release? No. Adrenalin is also released in
vigorous exercise. Context is crucial. How is it determined?
By the brain’s causal orientation in brain-operational terms.
The first is a threat; the second, exertion. Different categories-
of the-world arise with different categories-of-interaction—in
the first case external activity the brain takes as threatening;
for the jogger, the path ahead and leg ache. In other words,
adrenalin’s influence on causal orientation is qualified by cir-
cumstance. Claiming adrenalin causes fear is incorrect, as is
seeing a threatening situation. Adrenalin is a constituent of
causal orientation; seeing does not exist.16
Pessoa comments ‘it may be time to stop describing con-
cepts in terms of dichotomies [ref. Newell 1973; Kelso and
Engstrøm 2006] and to adopt a vocabulary that views con-
cepts as complementary pairs that mutually define each other
and, critically, do not exclude each other’ (2013, p. 5).
Therefore ‘I believe it is more fruitful to describe mental phe-
nomena in terms of cognitive-emotional interactions’ (ibid.).
Brain-sign theory discards mentalist terminology (i.e.
Pessoa’s ‘descriptive’ usage of cognition-emotion) locating
brain-signs in neural structures and conditions derived from
the causal orientation. The point is not that this can be done
today; rather it offers a constructive route in grounding future
brain science.
An example is, ‘disappointment’ resulting from an event or
situation not matching hopes or wishes. The person, the sup-
posed self, feels ‘let down’ or failed in ‘what was wanted’.
The brain-sign reconstruction emphasises causal orientation
(immediate or subsequent) as brain networks directed at a
biophysically describable relation toward the world (generat-
ing control, co-opting allies, endorsement of actions).
Organisms are continually baulked in such events, to a greater
or lesser degree. They adapt their networks accordingly, e.g.
altering their instructions or aborting the activation.What does
not happen is human subjects pondering the situation and
making mental decisions (cf. Carruthers). So, while pain/
pleasure or love/hate accounts have been neurally generated
as simpler explanations than brain analysis, they are inade-
quate for science (e.g. Freudian psychology, and contra
Solms 2018). Categories-of-interaction related to causal ori-
entation offers a plausible investigative route.
As mentioned, the motivations people are deemed to have
are non-scientific categories, as are Aristotelian ‘purposes’.
The physical universe has no purposes or motivations
(contra Pessoa, chapter 6; Berridge 2018). The current con-
cern for mental health as distinct from physical health (daily
expressed in the news) is as scientifically unhelpful as phlo-
giston before molecular chemistry.
*
The terms ‘exteroception’ and ‘interoception’ have become
current: the first, perception of the external world; the second15 An indicative example is chronostasis resulting from the rapidmovement of
the eyes (the saccade) to a new target resulting in the stopped-clock illusion.
The second hand appears to have a longer immediate delay before moving
than subsequently because the brain anticipates the saccade. See further Knoll
et al. (2013).
16 For recent discussion of constitution and causality, see, e.g. Kästner and
Anderson (2018).
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perception of inner states of the body. Obviously, the terms
presume the capacity for ‘perception of…’ As Cynthia Price
and Carole Hooven put it: ‘What becomes conscious, i.e. in-
teroceptive awareness, involves the processing of inner sensa-
tions so they become available to conscious awareness’
(2018).
Erik Ceunen et al. (2016) claim that ‘‘Interoception’ is a
concept which relates to a…wide range of health…and psy-
chological aspects of human life, playing a role in every indi-
vidual…. A cursory glance at the literature is sufficient to see
… a vast range of subjects.’ The authors generate a list of
‘inner’ conditions including: medically defined symptoms,
emotions in general, decision making, and subjective time
perception. Pain is particularly significant. They quote The
International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP). Pain
is ‘An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associat-
edwith actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms
of such damage’ (Merskey and Bogduk 1994). This makes no
attempt at science. Giving this diversity a technical name does
not solve the mind-body problem.
The authors say that ‘The only thing determining whether
something is interoceptive is whether it contributes to the sub-
jective perception of body state.’ So whether there is actual
damage, in the case of pain, is irrelevant to interoception if it is
felt. For example, ‘The findings [of McGrath et al. 2013]
suggest that at least for major depression, and perhaps for
mood and other disorders, there are two subgroups of pa-
tients…one…with an overactive anterior insula, the other…
with an underactive anterior insula. These two…neurological
biomarker patterns…are suggestive respectively of accurate
and inaccurate perceivers…. Regardless of the accuracy with
which individuals with mood and anxiety disorders can per-
ceive sensory homeostatic afferent feedback, individuals with
such disorders excessively rely on sources other than the ac-
tual bottom–up homeostatic pathways, giving more weight to
maladaptive cognitive-emotional schemes of interpretation
(Paulus and Stein 2010).’ I.e. over- and underactive neural
conditions generate ‘biased’ accounts.
This is supported by the authors’ comment that ‘Seth
(2013) proposes that interoception…is not just passive,
bottom–up processing, but…also involves active top–down
activation to make predictions of the causes of sensory input.
His view is…that perception is a process of not only afferent
feedback, but also of predictions, and ultimately the integra-
tion of both, resulting in prediction errors.’ An expanded con-
structivist account (cf. Koenderink and Krueger 2017), now
concerning ‘inner’ states.
Brain-sign theory contributes twofold. There are no subjec-
tive phenomenological states, and there is a clear discrimina-
tion of the world as represented (including what is termed
imagined and remembered), and a response to it. So, ‘pain’
which is not caused by body damage yet ‘felt’ is categories-of-
the-world and categories-of-interaction. The pain ‘felt’ is
bodily, though an operational misnomer—i.e. how the brain
categorises it as brain-sign. Major depression and mood dis-
orders (categories-of-interaction) are neurologically commu-
nicated representations. Which is why they ‘play a role for
every individual,’ as the authors say, and not because mental
states exist or influence behaviour.
Language Redesigned
Language has been a great mystery. How does it raise us
beyond other creatures? How can words change minds or
influence actions? But at the heart of these questions is a
profound mistake.
Brain-sign language is not language as generally supposed,
i.e. that we (mentally) understand words and sentences and act
upon them. Understanding is a prescientific concept, which
dissolves a central plank of Kant’s doctrine. But before ad-
dressing the mistake, the principles of the brain-sign theory
approach are outlined.
Because the universe is physical, a scientific theory needs to
determine the physical characteristics of the linguistic process.
Language is not a phenomenon of mind. It is an evolved means
for one organism to change the causal orientation of another
(contra Chomsky, e.g. 2016; Dehaene 2014, p. 250). This is
effected by the generation and reception of compression waves
between brains from/to vocal mechanism and ears. In the case of
humans, it also entails transmission by electromagnetic radiation
via the eyes (‘reading’). Physical transmission is a basic inter-
organism practice. Many creatures sign by molecular transmis-
sion for location marking. Urine spray is customary for dogs. So
language has no transcendent characteristics. Complexity is the
feature language offers, resulting from associated brain capacity.
The foundational principle is that language is ‘learned’ and
maintained, not aswords and sentences, but as neural elements of
causal orientation. That is, words are linked (as brain-signs) with
behavioural actions in relation to the organism’s engagement
with the world. For example, the word ‘apple’ activates behav-
ioural networks associated with apples. When one brain (A)
executes the transmission of compression waves to another (B),
the word ‘apple’ occurs in the latter’s brain as brain-sign. But the
causal path for the word to become the brain-sign occurrence
results from the association inB’s brainwith its causal orientation
towards apples. In other words, brains do not have dictionaries of
words with meaning. B’s brain-sign of ‘apple’ is a signification
of causal networks in B’s brain. The word ‘apple’, which A and
B then hold in common, is a joint association of causal possibil-
ities (actions in the world) associated with apples. Words (so-
called) are neural signifiers of causal orientations, i.e. subsets of
the totality of possibilities, and not added mental conditions that
are understood and can affect actions. How the brain generates
brain-sign in this situation is not yet established. However, its
operational function is on the same grounds as other brain-sign
elements.
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Thus, in training an infant to associate a word with an object,
the adult attempts to generate in the child the sameneural operation
he/she has. However, the adult has no access to the nature of his/
her own operative neural structure because that is not revealed by
the brain in its operation. Brain-sign itself, as said, has no causal
impact on the organism’s own actions. It is purely a sign.
What seems to happen is that the adult points to an object and
says its name. By thatmethod, in an opaqueway, the adult forces
the word into the infant’s head for each occasion the object is
before it. But while this is an automatic method of the concerned
parent (as ‘supposed’ by him/her), what happens is more com-
plex. When the adult engages with an object with its brain caus-
ally orientated towards it, the neurally interpreted name as brain-
sign can also occur. These two brain-sign elements (object and
word) coexist. This elaborate neural event is to be installed in the
child. The child’s brain is being trained to associate its causal
orientation towards the object, from which its brain-sign of the
object is derived, with its causal orientation towards the com-
pression waves impact by which the name will become a linked
neural structure. After the structure is built, and when activated
by compression waves from an external source, the name will
occur in the child as a brain-sign evoking the causal neural struc-
tures associated with the object. This replaces the notion of
meaning. The ‘sense’ we know what a word means is the com-
municative act (cf. ‘perception’, ‘Perception Redesigned’). The
occurrent word does not reference the world object.
In summary, the causal orientation of one brain can alter the
causal orientation of another, which is signified by the coinci-
dence of brain-signs (words and objects) from those causal
orientations. The word ‘is’, for example, evokes that to which
causal orientation is possible, not the mysterious notion Being
which inspired Heidegger ((1927), 1962).17 Searching for men-
tal states of language is a misapplied effort. Of course, neuro-
science should be concerned with the where and how brain-
sign is manufactured; but as a sign, it is not a gift of knowledge.
Talking to each does not concern world reality; the words sig-
nify brain causality which is an ‘invisible’ reality.
As the infant grows, the causal properties of its brain de-
velop, so associations with what a word (and its influence
within sentences) signifies vastly expand in its potential action
capability. This is inaccurately termed greater knowledge or
wisdom. Reading a story (electromagnetic communication),
while apparently an enjoyable occupation for the child (cate-
gories-of-interaction), is actually an engagement of the brain’s
causal orientations. No human gets to the raw processes of the
brain because the brain builds its causal functionality and then
signifies it for communication.
*
The Preface to W.V.O. Quine’s book Word and Object
exactly reflects brain-sign functioning. ‘Language is a social
art…. There is no justification for collating linguistic mean-
ings unless in terms of men’s dispositions to respond overtly
to socially observable stimulations. An effect of recognizing
this limitation is that the enterprise of translation is found to be
involved in a systematic indeterminacy’ (1960, p. ix). The
point is not that ‘dispositions to respond’ or ‘stimulations’
are not the base conditions for ‘indeterminacy’. It is that brain
communication by signification depends upon neural struc-
tures (causal orientations) which are different in individuals,
particularly across languages. They serve an often communi-
cative adequacy.
Summary
Brain-sign theory offers an account accessible as science
which mentalism does not.
Subjectivity is replaced by biology enabling collective ac-
tion amongst organisms. That behaviour exists in compara-
tively primitive organisms but reaches its complexity-zenith
and flexibility in humans, who co-signify the world in which
joint action can occur. It is not an input to the brain, but
aprofile of action in the world held in common. Many writers
emphasise the ability of humans to communicate, but their
approach is dogged by the history of mind as a private
individualised condition.
The theory has two major impacts. (1) The structures and
states of neural causal orientations, from which brain-signs de-
rive, require a descriptive vocabulary identifying resulting behav-
iour. This is a major task since there is no likelihood of one-to-
one correspondence, and causal brain states are highly complex.
However the assumptions of mentalism obscure this crucial ac-
tivity. Indeed, it is likely that the current identification of active
brain areas associated with mental function is often associated
with causal orientations. However, brain-signs are brain explana-
tions of its operation which may, therefore, aid neuroscientific
investigation. (2) The theory alters human self-conception, in-
cluding denial of knowledge. Humans neither know nor believe
anything. Neural structures and states determine the organism’s
action in the world, not word formations or feelings. This way of
viewing human life is a scientific upgrade from psychology.
While radical as a proposal—though individuals have proffered
adjacent hypotheses—the function of brain-sign completes a sci-
entific account that potentially could improve human decision
making and behaviour, so influencing adaptation and survival.
These will be long term developments.
Brain-sign is a scientific hypothesis. But the actuality of its
implementation cannot be known (or explained). As Galileo
said, ‘There is not a single effect in nature…such that the most
ingenious theorist can arrive at a complete understanding of
it.’18 Brain-sign theory is why.
17 Heidegger says: ‘It is said that ‘Being’ is the most universal and emptiest of
concepts.’ Being and Time (p. 2). 18 Quoted from Chomsky 2016, p. 91.
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